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Getting Back to Idolatry Critique: Kingdom, 
Kin-dom, and the Triune Gift Economy
David Horstkoetter
Liberation theology has largely ceased to develop critiques of idolatry, espe-
cially in the United States. I will argue that the critique is still viable in Christian 
theology and promising for the future of liberation theology, by way of reformu-
lating Ada María Isasi-Díaz’s framework of kin-dom within the triune economy. 
Ultimately this will mean reconsidering our understanding of and commitment to 
divinity and each other—in a word, faith.1 
The idea to move liberation theology from theology to other disciplines 
drives discussion in liberation theology circles, especially in the US, as we talk 
about the future.2 Yet if we turn to, say, social and critical theory as primary lenses, 
can the future of liberation theology still allow for the charge of idolatry that it 
once maintained? To say yes to idolatry critique seems to require something that 
other disciplines cannot fully support or sometimes even consider: namely faith as 
humanity’s positive response to both transcendent and immanent divine work.3 
1 I want to make a quick note about social location because liberation theology is inherently 
contextual. Describing my own social location means recognizing that I am not in the US minority in 
any sense of the term. Indeed, I am a white, heterosexual male and my birth in this country is without 
dispute. Also, I found myself with the ‘camp’ described by Christopher Ashley’s paper “Liberation and 
Postliberalism,” where previously I was not sure where I might ‘fit’ in relation to liberation theology. 
While my own location is important to acknowledge, it is not the social or theological location I 
mean for this article. Instead, I mean to establish the social location of the main argument: beside the 
obvious theological reasons noted in the text, I want to make explicit that this argument is made with 
attention to rising economic sovereignty, even though it has yet to (and may never fully) claim the 
modern nation state’s monopoly on violence, and democratic governance presuming equal relations.
2 For instance, see Ivan Petrella’s The Future of Liberation Theology (London, England: 
SCM, 2006) and Beyond Liberation Theology: A Polemic (London, England: SCM, 2008). Hereafter 
The Future of Liberation Theology will be cited as Future and Beyond Liberation Theology will be cited 
as Beyond. I agree with Petrella that the disconnection between theological criticism and a concrete, 
constructive solution is problematic (Future, 39). Indeed, liberation theology today often sounds more 
like critical theory than an endeavor to construct concrete projects, or as he calls them “historical 
projects.” Theology should certainly work with sociology, and indeed the historical project aspect is 
crucial, at least in part because divine work is active in human history. It is how theology relates to 
sociology and historical projects that is the issue here. 
3 One could say that the idolatry critique has simply mutated. It is distinctly possible to read 
the word fetish, when used by liberation theologians, as idolatry (Franz Hinkelammert makes this 
very connection in “Economic Roots of Idolatry: Entrepreneurial Metaphysics,” in The Idols of Death 
and the God of Life, ed. Pablo Richard and trans. Barbara E. Campbell and Bonnie Shepard (Maryk-
noll, NY: Orbis, 1983), 191). However, I am not convinced that this is without its problems. On what 
theological basis does one measure fetish? Sociology, or perhaps better stated, critical theory, and libera-
tion theology may say similar things as noted by Petrella (Beyond, 5-16, 45); however, while liberation 
theologians have used Marx as a critical tool to counter capitalism, Marxists nevertheless would not 
Critical theory’s concept of ideology is helpful, but when it flattens the idolatry 
critique by identifying idolatry as ideology, and thus making them synonymous, 
ideology ultimately replaces idolatry.4 I suspect that ideology here passes for dif-
fering positions within sheer immanence, and therefore unable to produce a “rival 
universality” to global capitalism.5 Therefore I worry that the political future will 
be a facade of sheer immanence dictating action read as competing ideologies—
philosophical positions without roots—under the universal market.6 Ideology is 
thus made subject to the market’s antibodies, resulting in the market commodi-
fying ideology.  The charge of idolatry, however, is rooted in transcendence (and 
immanence), which is at the very least a rival universality to global capitalism; the 
critique of idolatry assumes divine transcendence and that the incarnational, con-
structive project of divine salvation is the map for concrete, historical work, both 
constructive and critical. This is why, when ideology is the primary, hermeneutical 
category, I find it rather thin, unconvincing, and unable to go as far as theology.7 
Also, although sociological work is necessary, I am not sure that it is primary for 
realizing divine work in history. Yet, theology’s constructive vision of “God of 
Life” is no longer sufficient for some.8 In contrast to others who go to sociology to 
recognize the theologians as Marxists. The distinction makes all the difference. The point is this: as 
soon as one uses the theological measuring stick, the entirety of the theological context is at play.
4 This concern over immanence and transcendence influencing idolatry and ideology is in-
formed by Charles Taylor’s work on “closed world structures” and “immanent frame.” Charles Taylor, 
A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), 551-592. The concern over distinc-
tion between ideology and faith is also informed by Gary Dorrien’s analysis of James Cone, Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, and Juan Segundo in Reconstructing the Common Good: Theology and the Social Order 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 115-124. It is important to note that Dorrien explicitly deals 
with Segundo’s work on the tension between ideology and idolatry. The concern over distinguishing 
between the two is not my own.
5 John Milbank, “The Politics of Time: Community, Gift and Liturgy,” Telos 113 (Fall 
1998): 53. I use Milbank here knowing that there is disagreement between, say, Petrella and Milbank 
over the larger issue of relating sociology and theology. I do not intend my use of Milbank to indicate 
that I ‘side’ with Milbank, but rather simply that I agree with some of his worries concerning the 
nature of capitalism and the necessity of thick transcendence along with immanence.
6 Of course competing ideologies is far from an original conclusion. Here I am drawing 
from Louis Althusser’s famous “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy 
and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 85-126.
7 For instance, Petrella uses Agamben to note that liberation theology’s critique of idolatry 
has seen “more deeply into our objectification than all of North Atlantic thought” (Beyond, 43). I 
certainly agree with this. Giorgio Agamben’s work on bare life is helpful, as is his related work on 
exception and sovereignty, but he certainly does not go as far as liberation theology.
8 Petrella, Future, 10-11. The argument I am making throughout this article could be read 
as recovering the idolatry critique by bringing Gutiérrez’s God of Life (trans. Matthew J. O’Connell 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991)) and Isasi-Díaz’s kin-dom framework together within a trinitarian 
economy. Interestingly, Petrella uses the phrase “God of life,” but does so through Sung, rather than 
Gutiérrez (Future, 37, fn. 44, and Beyond, 14). For more on Sung’s God of life, see Jung Mo Sung, 
Desire, Market and Religion (London, England: SCM Press, 2007), 9. My statements above concern-
ing idolatry and ideology may or may not be in conflict with Sung’s construal of Segundo on idolatry 
within ideology (Desire, Market and Religion, 98). It certainly complicates my quote of Sung, in a later 
footnote, about faith as an epistemological revolution, but if we want something less vague than God 
of life, it is my position that letting ideology be the meta-category will not get us there. Furthermore, I 
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differentiate liberation theology’s God of life from the simulacra of the status quo, 
I turn first to theology.9 I find the triune economy thick and incarnational, and 
it thereby provides a specific map for the concrete, historical work for a facet of 
divine salvation called liberation. The triune economy attends to the concerns of 
liberation theology, if it is not actually the heart of liberation theology’s construc-
tive vision (orthopraxy), and therefore grounds idolatry critique.10 
However, establishing the vision and recovering the idolatry critique is not 
without its difficulties. The critique of idolatry—the rejection of the “worship 
of the false gods of the system of oppression”—has been one of the hallmarks of 
liberation theology.11 Indeed, the critique of placing a created thing in the position 
of divinity was crucial to early liberation theology. Yet, on the whole, the critique 
find it interesting that even those who embrace a closed system, and themselves are atheists, neverthe-
less turn to religion—specifically the intersection of transcendence and immanence—to characterize 
or give as the preeminent example of transcendence within immanence (e.g. for Alain Badiou, Saint 
Paul on the road to Damascus and his work afterward is the in-breaking event of immanence repre-
sented as containing the possibility of the infinite. See St. Paul: The Foundations of Universalism, trans. 
Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003)).
9 This is what marks the major difference between Petrella’s work (Future, 10-11, 37) and 
my argument here. “The real question comes after the critique of idolatry: what do we do instead?” 
(Future, 11). My answer is in part this article. The idolatry critique is indeed negative, but it is based 
on something much deeper and specific than life—the triune life that redeems humanity through 
the divine economy. If concepts, like God of life, are too vague or distant from life, historical projects 
will not fix what appears to some to be sophisticated theological platitudes. (This is directly contrary 
to Petrella (Future, 38) insomuch as he seems to think enough theology has been done.) After all, 
“[f ]aith in the resurrection of Jesus is an ‘epistemological revolution’—a revolution in the way of 
knowing—which allows us to discover the true image of God and the human being” (Sung, Desire, 
Market and Religion, 25). If we do more rigorous, theological reflection—that more strongly teases 
out the political implications in theology—then we can distinguish the necessary shape and more 
specific direction of the historical projects, rather than assert a morality via historical projects defined 
by sociology or critical theory. I believe here that I am following the basic notion of orthopraxy, rather 
than assuming history will define vague ideals. And so I am sympathetic to the form and content 
unity that Petrella seems to assume: “The construction of historical projects, therefore, is not merely 
the application of theological concepts to the social realm but part and parcel of the definition of the 
concepts themselves” (Future, 37 and addressed again on 39). Christianity says this about Jesus when 
it emphasizes the particularity of Jesus, never mind the fact that theology is inherently political when 
it affirms that the incarnation of the theology is part of its definition.
10 The constructive vision is salvation from social oppression into the beloved community by 
acting on bringing humanity into a life together (solidarity) through love and care defined by divinity 
(in the Christian case, Jesus). In other words, conditions of intelligibility and orthopraxy.
11 “Introduction,” Pablo Richard, ed. The Idols of Death and the God of Life, 1.
has seen little development in liberation theology for nearly three decades.12 This 
seems difficult to imagine, especially because the oppressive structures are still 
present and powerful as ever. It was liberation theology that changed; we now tend 
to call something evil or oppressive, but not an idol. Over the course of the 1980s 
and 90s, liberation theology’s development moved beyond the first wave and new 
voices began a transition to new, alternative frameworks that seemed to assume, 
but did not make use of or develop the idolatry critique. 
One such framework was Ada María Isasi-Díaz’s “kin-dom.”13 She skill-
fully argued that the gracious, salvific work of God, through love of the neighbor, 
entails solidarity characterized by interconnectivity—namely commonality and 
mutuality. This establishes a true dialogical relationship between oppressor and 
oppressed, as opposed to charity which is “a one-sided giving, a donation, almost 
always, of what we have in abundance.”14 Yet, rather than describe solidarity as 
God’s ‘kingdom,’ a term that Isasi-Díaz names as sexist and is in the contemporary 
context “hierarchical and elitist,” she instead uses the term “kin-dom” to empha-
size that the eschatological community will be a family: “kin to each other.”15 
12 I was initially alerted to this by Fr. Bryan Massingale at Marquette University during his 
course on Catholic social thought (Spring 2009). The two last major works in liberation theology 
focused on developing idolatry critique and translated into English are Pablo Richard, ed. The Idols of 
Death and the God of Life; and Franz Hinkelammert, The Ideological Weapons of Death: A Theological 
Critique of Capitalism, trans. Philip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1986). In Spanish, it is 
worth noting the work of Hugo Assmann, especially, La idolatía del Mercado (San José, Costa Rica: 
Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1997); and Jung Mo Sung, especially La Iolatría del 
Capital y la Merte de los Pobres (San José, Costa Rica: DEI, 1991). Sung also has work in English, like 
Desire, Market and Religion, see particularly pages 21-29, 72, 96-98; and has collaborated with Néstor 
Míguez and Joerg Rieger in Beyond the Spirit of Empire: Theology and Politics in a New Key (London, 
England: SCM, 2009). In some respect I would also count Ivan Petrella’s Beyond, which starts with a 
chapter on idolatry and life, and then turns the idolatry critique back on liberation theology to bring 
it out of its lost state. Despite that, I am unsure if Petrella is using idolatry in the full theological 
sense; Petrella certainly wants the prophetic force and clarity of liberation theology, but it seems that 
Petrella does not desire the robust theological ground that defines the term idolatry. However, without 
more constructive theology, the other option—immanent historical projects—is all that is left..
13 Ada María Isasi-Díaz, “Solidarity: Love of Neighbor in the 21st Century,” in Lift Every 
Voice: Constructing Christian Theologies from the Underside, eds. Susan Brooks Thistlewaite and Mary 
Potter Engel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. 1998), 30-39. The first edition was printed in 1990 and the 
expanded addition in 1998. The chapter is also reprinted in other volumes, like Mujerista Theology 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996) but I will be using Lift Every Voice for citation purposes concerning 
this chapter.
14 Isasi-Díaz, Lift Every Voice, 31.
15 Isasi-Díaz, Lift Every Voice, 32, fn. 8.
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Today the kin-dom framework seems obvious, which is a testament to its 
influence. While we do need to challenge sexist language and social hierarchy that 
leads to oppression, today the framework is not without its problems. As a frame-
work, it seems to have undercut the basis for idolatry critique for two reasons. First, 
because the charge of idolatry is predicated on kingdom theology, idolatry critique 
exited with the lack of focus on the kingdom of God that Isasi-Díaz critiqued.16 
Second, I am not convinced that the rising generation has the same key assump-
tions as Isasi-Díaz, but we still employ her notion of solidarity as a framework, 
although only as social solidarity in immanence so that orthopraxy has become a 
moral praxis.17 
In kin-dom, Isasi-Díaz rejected the modern sovereign as the image of God, 
and rightly so. The combination of problematic nominalist/voluntarist theology—
the hidden, distant, and unintelligible God of sheer power (potentia absoluta rather 
than potentia ordinata)—and recovering patriarchal Roman law (patria potestas) 
during the late middle ages became the basic structure used by Hobbes to create 
16 Of course there are exceptions—some indeed still maintain kingdom. I noted earlier 
that Petrella might be read in part this way, and Jon Sobrino’s recent No Salvation Outside the Poor: 
Prophetic-Utopian Essays (multiple translators (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2008)) is an exception on both 
counts. Yet even here Sobrino gives far less emphasis to kingdom than he once did, although it is 
still a critical ground for his work in the book. In Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social 
Christianity (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995), Gary Dorrien makes the claim that in “the biblical 
faith recovered by social Christianity, the reign of God is an immanent/eschatological reality that 
engenders community, peace, and justice. It is not a dispensable vestige of patriarchal religion but 
the heart of a liberating spiritual reality that transcends its patriarchal elements. Though [Dorrien] 
embrace[s] much of the radical feminist critique of classical Christian theism, [he] do[es] not accept 
the verdict that Christian kingdom language or Christianity itself is unredeemable for feminism. 
Rather, [he] argue[s] that the spiritual reality of the resurrected Christ is the ground of a hope that 
sustains and transcends Christian struggles for justice and peace” (19). Dorrien now may or may not 
back off from seeing kingdom as redeemable, but nevertheless, he is making an important point: 
without developing kin-dom to the complexity that kingdom has been developed, we lose truth that 
is recoverable. We may even lose our connection to avenues of liberation by classic North American 
theology. While Dorrien might be a liberal, the connection between the social gospel and liberation 
theology is close for him theologically and personally. In fact, they may be the same thing in a 
different key: “Moltmann and Gutiérrez both asserted... that the work of Rauschenbusch represented 
the most instructive precedent for a North American theology of praxis” (Reconstructing the Common 
Good, 10).
17 This is rendering Charles Taylor’s “closed world structures” in another key. Another 
presenter on the panel (at the Future of Liberation Theology conference where a condensed version 
of the article was presented), Elijah Prewitt-Davis directly affirmed the move to sheer immanence, 
seeming to assume that transcendence is outdated. He also argued that the world is ultimately 
characterized as closed. In fact, in his estimation and others also present for the paper, it is not that 
the world is shaped to look closed, it is closed. If the world truly is closed, or at least if we assume it 
is, then the implication of this essay is that the idolatry critique is out of reach—and so it makes sense 
that it has not undergone development for so long. It should not be surprising then that the continued 
emphasis on commonality and mutuality, without the previously assumed divine determination, 
results in sheer immanence that defines solidarity as social solidarity for its virtue as a political tool. 
This seems to be the general direction that Clayton Crockett moves in his recent Radical Political 
Theology: Religion and Politics After Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
the modern sovereign: the sovereign as the mortal god is a demi-god of power.18 It 
is this sovereign that lurks in the background of historical, European rule for much 
of modernity.19 
In response, we need to re-think the sovereign, but while Isasi-Díaz did not 
do so, she did still assume divine sovereignty.20 She amends the quotes of Gutiérrez 
that use the word “kingdom” with [sic], but she does not question divine sovereign-
ty when she quotes Gutiérrez again soon after: “Oppression and poverty must be 
18 For more, see the political scientist Michael A. Gillespie, “Sovereign Selves and Sovereign 
States: Political Theory for a New Millennium,” in Freedom and the Human Person, ed. Richard 
Velkley, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2007), 109-112, 114, 116; Nihilism before 
Nietszche (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), xiii; and The Theological Origins of 
Modernity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 22-23, 31, 41-43, 242-254. Louis 
Dupré, Passage to Modernity, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Religion and the Rise of 
Modern Culture (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); and “Secular Philosophy 
and Its Origins at the Dawn of the Modern Age,” in The Question of Christian Philosophy Today, 
ed. Francis J. Ambrosio (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1999), 61-79. Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, Sovereignty (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 52-55, 67, 108-114. Adrian Pabst, “Modern 
Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and Capitalism,” Modern Theology 26, no. 4 (October 
2010), doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.2010.01633.x. For philosophers on the importance of nominalism for 
modernity—that modernity is actually living out late medieval projects, rather than a sharp break 
from the medieval age—see Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith, eds., The Legitimacy of the Middle 
Ages: On the Unwritten History of Theory (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
19 I do not intend to say that patriarchy did not exist or was not endemic in the time between 
Rome and the late middle ages. I am simply pointing to what constitutes our understanding of 
kingdom today because Isasi-Díaz emphasized just that. Also, what I am saying is in part the product 
of descriptive analysis by Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben. Carl Schmitt 
famously stated that the “[s]overeign is he [sic] who decides on the exception” (Political Theology: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 5.). It was in that one observation that Schmitt realized that political liberalism is not 
self-grounding, and that despite the move to democracy, the Hobbesian sovereign still remains. 
Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics (The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége de France, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)) partially assumed this, but focused on the 
development of political and economic liberalisms: rather than let live or kill, the state today makes 
one live, but rarely actively kills. However, and here is part of why I still mention Hobbes, Giorgio 
Agamben criticizes Foucault for not seeing that the Hobbesian sovereign is still there (Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998); State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and 
The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Homo Sacer II, 
2), trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 2011)). 
What we need to do is rethink the sovereign, rather than abandon divine sovereignty because it has 
been defined by the late medieval and modern conceptions of God as sheer, arbitrary power that 
underlies patriarchy in general, and the Hobbesian sovereign in particular. Also, in relation to my 
constructive move about the triune economy, Agamben notes that it is “the Trinitarian oikonomia 
that may constitute a privileged laboratory for the observation of the working and articulation—both 
internal and external—of the governmental machine” (The Kingdom and the Glory, xi). This explains 
why Graham Ward writes about the “return of the king” (The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming 
Postmaterial Citizens (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 58-63). If we do not restructure 
or redefine, the notions of power that underly patriarchy in general, and the Hobbesian sovereign in 
particular, the power structures will not truly be dealt with.
20 For a very interesting and promising re-thinking of sovereignty, both divine and political, 
see Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012)—especially part one.
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overcome because they are ‘a slap in the face of God’s sovereignty.’ The alienation 
they cause is a denial of God.”21 In sum, kin-dom is theologically based on the 
God who holds together and defines reality. 
Therefore, while divine sovereignty is the basis for a theology of solidarity, 
it is also crucial for the critique of idolatry.22 The ground for calling idolatrous 
the perversions in the human city was that God had a city imbued with divinity’s 
warm, grand affirmation of creation and sharp rejection of sin and death.23 Indeed, 
without a divine kingdom for the human kingdom to presumptuously co-opt, 
there is nothing to be idolatrous about. Subsequently there is little theological 
ground to categorically question old fashioned imperialism, the new imperialism 
of bio-politics, or the sovereign market. Without measurement for idolatry, the 
ultimate outcome—that there is no idolatry—seems the most idolatrous position 
possible. This blindness is particularly disturbing for those of us made complicit in 
oppression just by simply living in the belly of the beast (the U.S.). 
So divine sovereignty is crucial, but, and this is the root of the problem, 
Isasi-Díaz does not develop divine sovereignty in light of kin-dom. The concept 
as a framework for solidarity is incomplete. Rightly smashing sexist notions, but 
without establishing a thick notion of divine sovereignty within the kin-dom 
framework, leaves us inadvertently cut off from older notions of kingdom and 
reign that Isasi-Díaz might allow, like basileia, that maintains emphasis on tran-
scendence necessary for the critique of idolatry.24 The problem is not with the goal 
21 Isasi-Díaz, 32-33. Interestingly, this paragraph on oppression rejecting divinity could very 
easily have used the word idolatry, but it does not. Instead it is construed as atheism.
22 Gutiérrez, God of Life, 48-64; Sung, Desire, Market and Religion, 27. Elizabeth Johnson 
notices this in Gordon Kaufman’s work (“God’s absoluteness, humaneness, and present presence 
and dimensions of the one living God, a concept which relativizes all idols and judges all human 
inhumaneness.”) and in liberation theology’s emphasis on the triune God and rejection of the 
nominalist God of sheer, arbitrary power (which characterized Hobbes’s sovereign): behind 
reformulating the “Trinity as a community of three distinct persons lies the common assumption of 
the political danger of nontrinitarian monotheism. One single God reigning in absolute power calls 
for one emperor or dictator similarly ruling. Imperial rule receives easy theological justification while 
human political dependency and attitudes of servitude are legitimated. In this context, the trinitarian 
doctrine takes on a corrective and liberating role insofar as it replaces the concept of a divine monarch 
with the social character of the triune God.” She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse (New York, NY: Crossroad, 2007), 208, 210.
23 For instance Petrella sees this when he follows Sung and Gutiérrez with the notion of “a 
unitary vision of history” (Beyond, 15).
24 Sung argues for transcendence, but as utopian vision—a teleological vision of sorts that 
he calls “utopian imagination” and “transcendental imagination” (Beyond the Spirit of Empire, 116, 
127, 129, 133). It sounds rather Niebuhrian in some ways, but the emphasis on God’s kingdom would 
make the later Niebuhr, the Christian realist, nervous. What I am getting at here with the use of 
transcendence and incarnation I believe to be thicker than the transcendence Sung describes. It is 
more than a vision, at least in part because it was also already inaugurated in Jesus. Too often I find 
that the eschatological vision, in its attempt to avoid naiveté, inadvertently lets us off the hook: ‘Those 
were nice things Jesus said, but he didn’t really mean them for today’ is the same logic that produces 
an untrue sympathy for liberation—‘Sure we should change things, but lets be pragmatic about this. 
What you suggest is too much of a category shift.’ This kind of sympathy, as it is only partial, does 
not go deep enough. When we do not go deep enough in our criticism and change, the theological 
life is co-opted. Despite our work and intentions, we become a simulacra. Vision, in combination 
of her chapter where she established kin-dom—to elaborate on love and equality 
amongst humanity as the divine path for the redemption for humanity—but in-
stead the issue is that as we make use of her concept of kin-dom, we should not use 
it as if it is a complete framework. It has understated assumptions, and ones not 
always held in the same way as those today who speak of solidarity. The ultimate 
outcome is that kin-dom as a framework inadvertently erodes the ground for the 
idolatry critique if we do not recognize, much less develop, her assumptions. 
Yet kingdom cannot simply be re-asserted, because Isasi-Díaz’s criticism 
of kingdom is not without truth: she takes us to the structural roots of sexism. 
Indeed there is little qualitative difference between so-called benign paternalism 
and outright domination; gentle colonialism and oppressive colonialism are still 
colonialism. So the argument for relational equality in humanity is needed, and 
this reformulates our understanding of God’s order. However, equality is worth 
affirming not just because of its political liberation, but first because relational 
equality is divine, and therefore true. It is the theological truth that shows a con-
structive vision of social relations attracted to the good (and therefore the ground 
for idolatry critique), rather than a negative theology of power relations. What is 
needed for deepening the kin-dom framework is a constructive theology that both 
affirms kin-dom and establishes an explicit ground necessary for idolatry critique. 
I suggest the trinitarian economy of gift, which is based on the “doctrine of the 
Trinity... a practical doctrine with radical consequences for Christian life.”25 I have 
various reasons for the triune economy, but most notably for its theological weight, 
continuity with kin-dom, and its future appropriateness to address the rise of 
sovereign, global capitalism.26 
The trinitarian economy is no obscure theology, and has been even recently 
developed by a diverse crowd of significant theologians like Kathryn Tanner, Eliza-
with memory (Beyond the Spirit of Empire, 156-158, here Joerg Rieger is using Johannes Metz on 
anamnesis), then is only the beginning, not the framework. Grace—the material manifestation of 
divine gift—is incarnational, not just visionary.
25 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco, 
CA: Harper Collins, 1993), 1. I also want to note that Miroslav Volf has rightly complicated the 
divinization of humanity through participating in the trinitarian relations (see After Our Own Likeness: 
The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 191-220, and “‘The 
Trinity is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,” 
Modern Theology 14, no. 3, (July 1998): 403-423). However, Volf nevertheless still notes “that in an 
important sense the doctrine of the Trinity does entail a ‘social program’ or, as [Volf] prefer[s] to put it, 
that it ought to shape our ‘social vision’” (“The Trinity is Our Social Program,” 406).
26 I believe that liberation theology has been responding and continues to adapt to the rise of 
not simply global capitalism, but a sovereign, global capitalism. One could simply point to liberation 
theology’s project of state building to combat economic oppression (the state needs to be fixed because 
it is the mechanism of keeping life together just), but liberation theology’s positioning of itself goes 
deeper. As much as liberation theology is contextual, the development of the current milieu also 
seems to be undergoing a fusing of sorts (Feminists do economics, racial studies do gender, etc.). If 
James Cone is correct that liberation theologies built on the logic of earlier liberation theologies (as he 
noted in ST 103, Fall 2006 at Union), then what we have here is the possible synthesis of a massively 
multi-faceted theology that maintains the anawim at the heart of its theology. So as much as there is 
a contextual difference, there is at root a grand commonality as well. Also, if the move from political 
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beth Johnson, Catherine Mowry LaCugna, Leonardo Boff, Douglas Meeks, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Sarah Coakley, Louis-Marie Chauvet, Miroslav Volf, Pope 
Benedict XIV, and John Milbank to name a few.27 The trinitarian economy is a 
dynamic, reciprocal relationship in unity that affirms distinctiveness and equality, 
and expands universally in new, creative ways. It is therefore up to the task for sup-
porting Isasi-Díaz’s notion of solidarity (as commonality and mutuality), friend-
ship, and more.28 However, the history of humanity’s gift giving is fraught with 
to economic sovereignty is indeed going on, it is distinctly possible that contextual difference will be 
variations on the theme of the haves and the have-nots under a sovereign global capitalism.
27 To be clear, I use the term trinitarian economy, and not social trinitarianism, for a 
specific reason: they are not same—those for and against in the social trinitarianism do not directly 
correspond to discussion over the economy between the persons in the Trinity. As for the list, I 
note the theologians here specifically because of the diverse range, which I believes strengthens the 
argument, and so I will be using a variety of sources to describe the traits of the triune economy. 
However, I do not mean to flatten the differences between the theologians. For instance, Balthasar 
seems to retain a hierarchy—the Father generating the Son—that Johnson would be opposed to in 
her vision of the radical egalitarian Trinity as a triple helix (She Who Is, 218-221). Indeed she sees a 
“mutual relation, radical equality, and communal unity in diversity inherent in the triune symbol” 
over and against patriarchy’s subordination in the Trinity. However, Balthasar is more complex than 
a simple subordinationism; indeed, he too seems to maintain some of what Johnson argues for: “The 
circular dynamism within God spirals inward, outward, forward toward the coming of a world into 
existence, not out of necessity but out of a free exuberance of overflowing friendship” (222). While 
there is clearly a tension, and I do not intend to reconcile Balthasar and Johnson here, there is some 
overlap between the two, particularly in terms of love and gift between the persons. It is this absolute 
love in gift, dynamically lived in the persons and resulting in healthy interpenetration (perichoresis), 
that I seek to push here. Gift giving is the life of the Trinity. Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2005). Johnson, She Who Is. Catherine Mowry LaCunga, 
God for Us. Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988). 
Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg Fortress, 1989). Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theological Drama Volume II: The Dramatis 
Personae: Man in God, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1990), 256. 
Sarah Coakley, “Why Gift? Gift, Gender and Trinitarian Relations in Milbank and Tanner,” Scottish 
Journal of Theology 61, no. 2 (April 2008), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0036930608003979; 
“‘Persons’ in the ‘Social’ Doctrine of the Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic Discussion,” in The 
Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, eds. Stephen T. David, Daniel Kendall, and 
Gerald O’Collins (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 123-144. Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and 
Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, S.J., and 
Madeleine Beaumont, (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1995), 108. Miroslav Volf, After 
Our Own Likeness, “‘The Trinity is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape 
of Social Engagement,” and Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005). Benedict XIV, Caritas in Veritate, Encyclical letter on integral human 
development in charity and truth, Vatican Web site, accessed April 23, 2012, http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_
en.html. John Milbank, “Can a Gift be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” 
Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (January 1995), doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.1995.tb00055.x; “The Politics of 
Time: Community, Gift and Liturgy”; Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 138-161; The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 
352-363; “The Soul of Reciprocity (Part Two): Reciprocity Granted,” Modern Theology 17, no. 4 
(October 2001): 485-507.
28 It is important to highlight that in Agabmen’s The Kingdom and the Glory, he ends at 
the trinitarian economy as the ground for equality, and therefore democracy, which at the very least 
deception, and when gift talk is weak it enables oppression rather than confronts 
it, so I feel the need to detail some basic elements of the trinitarian economy. 
First, the triune gift economy—as is the notion of divine sovereignty—is 
characterized by divine freedom.29 The implication then is that the God-who-gives 
does so in love, not obligation.30 Thus the character of the Trinitarian processio/cir-
cumincessio is sheer gift given in love.31 
shows that what I am doing in this argument is not without (partial) allies. But the trinitarian focus 
goes further than simply the root. Reflecting on Agamben, J. Kameron Carter has noted that a 
warped trinitarian logic is pervasive, and so if we are to challenge anything, we need to confront the 
trinitarian idolatry in the market and political governance by setting straight what the trinitarian 
economy really is and demands: Agamben “connects the problem of governance and economy to its 
original and paradigmatic home in Christian theology, especially patristic theology, where we find 
the divine economy articulated in Trinitarian terms. His argument is going to give many theologians 
heartburn because if he’s right, the problem of biopolitics represents an ongoing social display of 
a certain Trinitarian imagination that is so pervasive as to be now thorough, complete, and thus 
invisible to us.” With David Kline, “Race, Theology, and the Politics of Abjection: An Interview 
with J. Kameron Carter, Part I,” The Other Journal, accessed April 23, 2012, http://theotherjournal.
com/2012/03/26/race-theology-and-the-politics-of-abjection-an-interview-with-j-kameron-carter-
part-i/. Thus, getting the triune economy right is not only important to theology, it is also important 
for those only concerned with sheer immanence.
29 Divine freedom being: God is not determined, but instead “free in his [sic] self-possession” 
(Balthasar, 256). Also see Meeks, 110.
30 Tanner establishes this (74) before she launches into noncompetition, mutuality, and the 
Trinity (75-85). I am following a similar pattern in my description here of the triune economy.
31 I do not want to inadvertently re-establish the sexism that feminism has worked so 
hard to exorcise (e.g. kingdom to kin-dom). However, I have yet to decide between processio or, for 
instance, Johnson’s work. Johnson notes in She Who Is that the processio is one-way, and therefore 
asymmetrical, because it lacks equality (196). In fact, for Johnson, processio implies “rank” because 
of generation (197). One of the reasons in my argument here for noting processio is because it does 
connect with missio since both are about giving/sending kenoticly. While important, I do not have 
the space to work out the issue of generation subverting equality, other than the next three points. 
First, Tanner maintains the processio, but does not see hierarchy subverting equality in the economy, 
although this could be a misstep of course (74, 81). Second, I do not think I actually need to develop 
processio here because trinitarian generation is not the model of human participation: humanity 
cannot imitate triune generation in any sense. Human participation does have agency, but it is first 
dependent on divine work; we do not create ourselves or others. Humanity should realize the triune 
economy in fresh ways, but it is still a derivative realization—humans do not create in the divine 
way, and thus human hierarchy does not legitimately correspond to trinitarian generation. To make 
human hierarchy correspond to any notion of trinitarian hierarchy is a power move that has no 
revelatory (e.g. scriptural) support. One might call idolatrous such justification of a hierarchy because 
it attempts to elevate some finite beings to a transcendent position over and against other finite 
beings (Volf says just as much in “The Trinity is Our Social Program,” 405). Also, such hierarchy 
violates the equality inherent to humanity as created in the imago Dei. This ultimately means that 
if one maintains generation, there is the needed move to distinguish some divine action and human 
participation characterized as responsive to divinity that generates humanity and the equality within 
humanity. Identity and roles would not be precisely equal between divinity and humanity, but that 
is already established in the creator/created distinction. However, this does not undercut human 
work within the triune economy because human work is participatory, not generative. Third, if there 
is a hierarchy within the Trinity, and if it should correlate with human inter-relationality, it would 
roughly correspond with the one for whom God is partisan—the oppressed and their ‘friends’ as 
Isasi-Díaz calls them. They are the ones who would be subverting the system by living into the divine 
economy, and therefore forming the oppressed by rejection of oppression and invitation into the 
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Second, it affirms difference in unity because it has a sense of what Rowan 
Williams calls “positive otherness.”32 The intra-trinitarian life is characterized by 
space and otherness so that all the persons are distinct.33 Thus the divine life does 
not overtake the existence of each person, break down distinction, or annex and 
silence the particular under the guise of gift. The reality is quite the contrary. It 
could not work without valuing and ensuring the space for otherness. 
Third, perichoresis does expose one to another in a vulnerable way—it is after 
all kenotic—but perichoresis is based on mutual agency of equals in reciprocity, as 
opposed to simple submission.34 Perichoresis is through love and gift that which does 
not coerce and obliterate. Instead gift asks for the other to join in their own way. It 
affirms and calls; gift includes invitation. This establishes reciprocity, not market 
exchange.35 Grace is indeed pure gift, but it also seeks to call out grace in others.36 
Fourth, the trinitarian economy is coherent, cohesive, and expansive. Be-
cause the Trinity and its gift economy affirms and maintains distinction between 
the persons, it does not become unhinged and spin unbalanced. Because the 
divine economy. Nevertheless, I am reticent to argue for point three because humans are at best softly 
determinative insofar as they carry on God’s project, and humans are certainly not generative. In the 
end, I agree with the second point, and one can see this in the well traveled question: can humanity 
establish a hierarchy where it is the monarch or bishop that is the divine representative or tool on earth 
(e.g. the medieval monarch as a kind of regent)? As an Anabaptist, I say no.
32 “Positive otherness” is part of Williams’s summary of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s work. 
Rowan Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, eds. Edward T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2004), 
48. This corresponds with much of Johnson’s notion of friendship (216-218).
33 Balthasar, 257. Poetically he asserts: “there must be areas of infinite freedom that are already 
there and do not allow everything to be compressed into an airless unity and identity. The Father’s 
act of surrender calls for its own area of freedom; the Son’s act, whereby he receives himself from and 
acknowledges his indebtedness to the Father, requires its own area; and the act where by the Spirit 
proceeds, illuminating the most intimate love of Father and Son, testifying to it and fanning it into 
flame, demands its area of freedom.”
34 I say this specifically with legitimate feminist fears in mind: that theology has been and 
is used to make women vulnerable, and ultimately subservient, because patriarchal power denies 
women basic human agency. I do not believe that the trinitarian economy, although it may have 
a sense of service, takes from people their agency. Instead, it calls people into active participation, 
which presumes, affirms, and calls people to exercise agency (although not agency defined by self-
generation). Johnson notes this on 196 and 220-222 of She Who Is. However, on Johnson’s point about 
perichoresis, I am not sure that the tradition is as distinct from her own work as she argues it is.
35 Tanner, 62. This notion of gift that I advocate is suspicious of a “restricted economy” 
that may eventually collapse grace into an economy of bargain by emphasizing the completion of 
the circuit. Chauvet is directly influenced by Heidegger (Symbol and Sacrament, 21-83), but Chauvet 
can also be read from a ‘Hauerwasian’ lens, understanding the completion of the circuit, and grace 
itself, as Christological hospitality that the church is called to, which is part of proclaiming and 
living divine peace and the basileia (The Hauerwas Reader (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 
137). This may be understood as a disservice to Chauvet by some, but I do not think so in light of 
Chauvet’s notion of symbolic exchange (chapter 8), specifically because of his comments on narrative 
analysis, anamnesis, grace, and “return-gift” as ethics around the Eucharist (268-280) that draw from 
Johannes Metz’s work, which is similar to Hauerwas’s on this point (memory and narrative operating 
as formation).
36 Isasi-Díaz would agree considering she wrote and quoted Gutiérrez: “But though the kin-
dom is a gift of God, it also ‘requires certain behaviors from those who receive it’” (Mujerista, 117).
trinitarian economy relates in loving gift, it produces a dynamic life together that 
feeds one another. And because the economy is rooted in the boundless nature of 
divinity, there is no limit or finite me—and in this respect, grace as an economy 
of reciprocal giving is characterized by its over-flowing.37 This over-abundance 
indicates that grace meets and surpasses a need, but through a process that is not 
an economy of bargain, nor simply for one’s self. 
The over-abundant gift giving of the triune life is manifest in human history 
as the missio Dei (the missionary God)—the God-who-gives, gives God’s self to 
humans all created equal in the imago Dei.38 To say that God is missionary is not 
like the colonial, missionary movements characterized by cultural arrogance and 
coercive, white patriarchs.39 Missio is also quite different than the ‘gift’ of democ-
racy that the U.S. recently ‘gave’ Iraq via war.40 Instead, gift makes kenotic love 
concrete. A gift must be given in a healthy way and appropriate to the needs of the 
receiver; gift must be given in love and truth. An inappropriate gift is not actu-
ally a gift, it is at best a burden. Missio is about divine gift sent to invite humanity 
to reciprocate, and thereby participate in the divine economy.41 Responding to 
37 This point is crucial. John Milbank names this vital character as plenitude, while Louis-
Marie Chauvet puts it another way: “grace is essentially that which cannot be calculated and cannot 
be stocked” (Milbank, “Can a Gift be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” and 
Being Reconciled, 138-161; Chauvet, 108.) Caritas in veritate also attests to this character of grace: 
“Gift by its nature goes beyond merit, its rule is that of superabundance” (34).  I also want to note 
here, so as to be faithful to Milbank and Chauvet without simply repeating a footnote above, that they 
seem at odds. Chauvet, a Hiedeggerian, is highly suspicious of metaphysics while Milbank embraces 
metaphysics and Thomas. However, I believe that they may not be so far apart and in my mind I use 
D. Stephen Long’s Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2009), to bridge the two. I am not the first to see Chauvet as possibly amenable to a good metaphysics. 
For a perspective from an heir of Bernard Lonergan, see Joseph C. Mudd, “From De-ontotheology 
to a Metaphysics of Meaning: Louis-Marie Chauvet and Bernard Lonergan on Foundations in 
Sacramental Theology,” Proceedings of the North American Academy of Liturgy (2008).
38 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis, 2007), 389-393. A recent book by John Flett contests some of the narrative around missio 
Dei (The Witness of God: The Trinity, Missio Dei, Karl Barth, and the Nature of Christian Community 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010)); but nevertheless, the point still stands about divine mission as 
sending gift, which then characterizes human life.
39 I do want to continue acknowledging where there might be problems for some. To say 
that God is missionary can only be said from certain faiths—ones with certain notions of revelation, 
gift-giving, love defined in a certain way, and more. One may be able to fudge the Trinity for another 
faith if there is an understanding of faith as response to God’s gift that maintains a kind of relational 
equality between humanity under God. I will admit that this is not first a pluralist theology. Trinity 
resists translation into a pluralist framework because its basis is so very, if not uniquely Christian, 
which is also the root for disagreement with critical theory above. The Christian identity does not 
mean, however, that it is antithetical to interfaith dialogue. Quite the opposite, actually, but I do not 
have room here other than to point to projects like scriptural reasoning projects for interfaith dialogue 
that can be understood as sharing each others’ tradition through gift giving.
40 Missio is not about “bomb[ing] them into a higher rationality” (William Cavanaugh, “Does 
Religion Cause Violence?” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 35, no. 2 and 3 (Spring/Summer 2007), http://
www.hds.harvard.edu/news-events/harvard-divinity-bulletin/articles/does-religion-cause-violence).
41 For example, Jesus of Nazareth, a different kind of messiah than expected, was the 
incarnate, divine hesed seeking reconciliation through reciprocation. Hesed is the Hebrew concept of 
the creator’s persistent loving kindness towards Israel. Also, this sentence parallels Caritas in veritate 
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divine gift brings humanity into the triune life, and thus the qualities of divine 
relationality begin to constitute human relationality.42 The death of the divine 
giver is not the end of true gift; rather, it is the first gift that continues in plenitude 
and enables us to (re)give.43 Therefore the specific or particular instance of divine 
gift is meant to move beyond those who first receive, and expand into an alterna-
tive economy that is rooted in loving gift, positive otherness, openness, invitation, 
stability, and abundance.44 Indeed, the triune economy—through missio—redeems 
human relations, and in such a way that is focused on the common good. 
Of course one might object that divine plenitude is not an economic source 
for the poor, so gift is still asymmetrical, if not paternalistic, because the poor can-
not give gifts while the rich can. However, the triune economy is not a rich man’s 
game, or perhaps Jesus would have been a rich, Roman emperor.45 The oppressed 
still have agency, although oppression attempts to deny this. For example, there 
is prophecy, and that is a gift at the very least because it is revelatory. The call to 
redemption is a gift, so the voices of the oppressed are very important and should 
be received as gift.46 
 Redemption, through an economy of gift giving, affirms and deepens 
Isasi-Díaz’s concern for commonality and mutuality, her technical understanding 
of friendship, and her refusal of one-sided charity.47 This economy also provides 
(5): “Charity is love received and given. It is ‘grace’ (cháris). Its source is the wellspring of the Father’s 
love for the Son, in the Holy Spirit. Love comes down to us from the Son. It is creative love, through 
which we have our being; it is redemptive love, through which we are recreated. Love is revealed and 
made present by Christ (cf. Jn 13:1) and ‘poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit’ (Rom 5:5). 
As the objects of God’s love, men and women become subjects of charity, they are called to make 
themselves instruments of grace, so as to pour forth God’s charity and to weave networks of charity.” I 
do not believe that this notion of charity must be the same kind that Isasi-Díaz criticized because it is 
a two-way street and is charity as caritas, rather than giving some money to a homeless person on the 
sidewalk. However, Eugene McCarraher argues that Caritas in veritate does not go far enough (“Not 
Bold Enough: Why Did Benedict Pull His Punches?” Commonweal 136, no. 14 (August 2009): 11-
12). And so, while Benedict XVI may move towards restructuring the economy, we need to make sure 
that it does connect to the reality of the situation, hence the need for historical projects. Our words 
and deeds need to go far enough, otherwise the triune economy can be warped into the charity that 
Isasi-Díaz was confronting.
42 Worth noting is “the need for the oppressed to learn from the ‘friends,’ ... [s]olidarity 
requires a true dialogic relationships” (Isasi-Díaz, Lift Every Voice, 37). The reciprocity at work 
parallels the dialogic relationship that Isasi-Díaz envisioned. Walter Rauschenbusch notes this, and 
even uses the logic of gift to do so (A Theology for the Social Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1997), 141.
43 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 157.
44 Richard Bauckham, Bible and Mission: Christian Witness in a Postmodern World (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2005), 13.
45 Otherwise the gift economy would be the notion of charity in disguise that Isasi-Díaz is so 
concerned about. 
46 This parallels Isasi-Díaz’s “word uttered by the poor” that makes friends out of the 
oppressor (Lift Every Voice, 36).
47 What is problematic concerning commonality and mutuality in the kin-dom framework 
is that they are predicated on only social reality. On one hand this is necessary because Isasi-Díaz 
is trying to get the oppressed to unify by virtue of them being in similar circumstances. On the 
other hand, this is a commonality and mutuality that does not distinguish between commonality 
the basis for idolatry critique. Here is an incarnational, and therefore enfleshed, 
economy that is so different from capitalism’s market that it is difficult not to call 
that market anti-Christ. The divine economy supplies an intelligible measurement 
for the charge of idolatry directed at contemporary mammon—Wall Street—
without relying on the coercive, sexist, white monarch of Hobbes. Rather than 
life actualized in bargain, subject to a scarcity model, limited to competition, or 
valued by arbitrary worth, life is instead valued by divinity’s sovereignty and grand 
abundance.48  This can be incarnated (e.g. historical projects) in numerous ways 
and Kathryn Tanner, Douglas Meeks, Michael Naughton, Phillip Goodchild, 
Gary Dorrien, and Isai-Díaz have outlined multiple avenues.49 
In sum, the idolatry critique is still viable. We can still access it and use it, 
but in order to do so, we need to develop the constructive vision of Christianity 
of circumstances and commonality of self-interest, and it makes little mention of commonality of 
the body of Christ (although I do think Isasi-Díaz has this operating). Of course self-interest is not 
inherently bad, but it is the basis of our capitalist economy, so we need to make sure that kin-dom 
inherently opposes capitalism’s logic of self-interest. Gift giving does so more sharply than what 
mutuality does in kin-dom (Tanner, 75-85, and also 92-95, 101-142). Also, gift giving is that which 
can transcend where there is not already commonality or mutuality—it is how one makes friends. 
It is “what connects and unites” (Milbank, The Future of Love, 352). Here is where gift shows the 
problem with commonality as the basis. For the oppressors to become friends of the oppressed, they 
heed a moral call and must give up their commonality of self-interest with the oppressors. Yet on what 
basis? To truly give up idols, and their strong temptations, requires something more than a strong 
moral constitution. It requires something that overcomes the idolatrous creation and maintenance of 
social divisions. As invitation ultimately derived from divine vision, gift works directly to overcome 
the social divisions of culture. Tanner notes: “As a gift giver you identify yourself very closely with all 
those you would not naturally resonate with or feel sympathy for because of their cultural and social 
differences from you” (80). Thus gift both begins the process of solidarity and is the realization of 
solidarity in a specific, concrete way.
48 Chauvet, 108. Also worth noting is that, because of positive otherness and abundance, 
cultural differences, gender differences, etc. are not wiped off the table but embraced. For instance, 
this affirms: “Interaction among Latinas and non-Latinas will lead to participation and inclusion in a 
way that does not require us to renounce who we are” (Isasi-Díaz, Mujerista, 118). One may say that 
covenant is in the category of bargain; however, to do so misconstrues the gracious nature in which 
God acts, even when in conditional promise (e.g. some form of lavishing, steadfast love—hesed—is 
gracious, even when the other party does not live up to their agreement). This the Hebrew Bible attests 
to over and over.
49 Tanner, 89-142. Meeks attempts to revise conceptions of numerous topics in God the 
Economist. Michael Naughton immediately connects the triune economy to the business world in his 
work, especially in The Logic of Gift: Rethinking Business as a Community of Persons (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 2012). Philip Goodchild works on the credit system in Theology of Money 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 201-255. Of course there is Gary Dorrien’s work 
on democratic socialism (sometimes called economic democracy): The Democratic Socialist Vision 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986); Reconstructing the Common Good; Economy, Difference, 
Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), 87-184. 
In fact, in Reconstructing the Common Good, Dorrien explicitly states that Gutiérrez, Segundo, and 
even Bonino need democratic socialism, and the reason is for establishing a concrete historical 
project stemming from their theology (112, 158-159). And still more, while Isasi-Díaz talks about 
equalizing power—“restitution” (Mujerista, 121)—she also rightly held a deep notion of the dialogic 
relationship, so restitution is only the beginning: “Mutuality among the oppressed and between the 
oppressed and their ‘friends’ is not simply a matter of reciprocal understanding and support, though 
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in light of the truth that Christianity proclaims (transcendence and immanence 
together in the Incarnation) for grounding the idolatry critique; we need to deepen 
the theological ground and make more explicit the political implications of the 
prevailing theological frameworks for informing, if not guiding or even generat-
ing, historical projects. I have endeavored to quickly show that the trinitarian 
economy does just that, and is especially applicable because it is immediately 
interactive with the social aspect of sin that generates structural evil, maintains 
continuity with liberation theology’s second wave, and will be more relevant in the 
future as global capitalism continues to extend its sovereignty.
that is or could be a very positive side effect. Mutuality as an element of solidarity must push the 
oppressed and their ‘friends’ to revolutionary politics” (Lift Every Voice, 37). As much as this might 
be limiting the purchase of historical violence from the past, it is also calling the rich to participate 
in the gift giving already being done by the oppressed. I do want to note here that reciprocity as I 
have used it throughout the argument is not exactly the same as John Rawls’s notion that Isasi-Díaz 
uses at times (specifically Mujerista, 122) because it is bound up in Rawls’s overall project, which I 
find unconvincing.
